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ARTICLES
AN OVERVIEW OF DEFENSES AVAILABLE TO
GUARANTORS OF REAL PROPERTY SECURED
TRANSACTIONS UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW
Maxwell M. Freeman* & Elizabeth Freeman Gurev*"
INTRODUCTION
The climate of California's real estate market from 1987-
1996 has caused many developers to default on loans ac-
quired for development of real property. The typical struc-
ture of these loans consists of a loan to acquire the real prop-
erty (land loan), a loan to construct improvements on the
property (construction loan), a deed of trust to secure the
promissory note evidencing the debt, and a personal guar-
anty of the note by the developer.
If the developer (or other prime obligor) defaults on the
loan, the lender may generally proceed along one of three
paths to seek recovery. The lender may foreclose nonjudi-
cially, foreclose judicially, or forego foreclosure and proceed
directly against the guarantor on his or her personal guar-
anty. However, no matter which path is chosen, the lender's
ability to recover against the personal guarantor will be lim-
ited by relevant antideficiency legislation, suretyship stat-
utes, and case law. This article provides an analysis of many
traditional and untraditional defenses available to a personal
guarantor after a default by the developer (or other prime
obligor/borrower).
Section I, the background section, provides an overview
of the general issues relevant to the liability of prime obligors
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and guarantors of real property secured loans. A more thor-
ough analysis of the traditional commentary on these issues
can be found in many sources.' Sections II-VI of this article,
however, present guarantor liability/defense theories not
typically addressed by commentators.
Section II of this article explains typical and atypical ap-
plications of the so-called "Gradsky defense."2 This section
also explains why the established due process test articu-
lated in Cathay Bank v. Lee3 for evaluating the adequacy of
waivers, such as the Gradsky waiver, was not abrogated by
recently enacted section 2856 of the California Civil Code.4
Section II also explains that section 2856 of the California
Civil Code should not be applied retroactively to guaranties
executed prior to January 1, 1997.
Section III explicates the guarantor's argument that if a
lender proceeds by judicial foreclosure, a guarantor, like the
prime obligor, should be able to invoke the fair value protec-
tions of section 726(b) of the California Code of Civil Proce-
dure,5 and limit his guarantor liability to the difference be-
tween the unpaid balance of the note (plus expenses) and the
fair value of the property.
Section IV reviews traditional applications of the "sham
guaranty doctrine," but more importantly provides an in-
depth analysis of why a guaranty of a nonrecourse note se-
curing real property is an unenforceable sham.8
Section V discusses some unique applications of section
2809 of the California Civil Code,7 including why section 2809
prevents a lender from enforcing a guaranty of a nonrecourse
1. See, e.g., ROGER BERNHARDT, CALIFORNIA MORTGAGE AND DEED OF
TRUST PRACTICE § 2.1, at 51 (2d ed. 1990); 4 HARRY D. MILLER & MARvIN B.
STARR, CURRENT LAW OF CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE (2d ed. 1989); MARGARET
SHENEMAN, CALIFORNIA FORECLOSURE: LAW AND PRACTICE (Shepard's, rev.
1991); see also discussion infra Section I.
2. Union Bank v. Gradsky, 71 Cal. Rptr. 64 (Ct. App. 1968).
3. 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 420 (Ct. App. 1993).
4. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2856 (West Supp. 1996).
5. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726(b) (West 1980 & Supp. 1996).
6. A judicial finding that a guaranty is a "sham" is significant to a guaran-
tor because then the guarantor may directly invoke antideficiency legislation
protections. See discussion infra Section V.B. Moreover, waivers in a sham
guaranty may be void as against public policy because the guarantor is actually
a prime obligor. See discussion infra Section IV.C.
7. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2809 (West 1993). The code provides a defense to a
guarantor where a guarantor's obligation is either "large in amount" or "more
burdensome" than that of the prime obligor. Id.
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loan.8
Finally, Section VI analyzes a relatively recent decision
by the court of appeal for the first district, River Bank Amer-
ica v. Diller,9 wherein the court improperly declined to evalu-
ate the adequacy of an express waiver of section 2809 of the
California Civil Code by the established test articulated in
Cathay Bank v. Lee.10
I. BACKGROUND: OVERVIEW OF LIABILITY OF PRIME
OBLIGORS AND GUARANTORS OF REAL PROPERTY SECURED
LOANS
A. Nonjudicial Foreclosure and the Gradsky Defense
After a default by a developer (or other prime obligor), a
lender may seek recovery by nonjudicial foreclosure if the
deed of trust contains a power of sale clause." However, the
lender generally is precluded from obtaining a deficiency
judgment from the prime obligor following a nonjudicial fore-
closure pursuant to section 580d of the California Code of
Civil Procedure. 2 Moreover, where a lender chooses nonjudi-
cial foreclosure, it is now well established that the lender is
thereby estopped from recovering a deficiency from the guar-
antor pursuant to the so-called Gradsky defense. 3 Under the
Gradsky defense, a lender is estopped from collecting a defi-
ciency from the guarantor after a nonjudicial foreclosure be-
cause the election of this particular remedy acts to cut off a
guarantor's subrogation rights against the prime obligor." In
response, lenders have routinely placed language in the
guaranty contract which purports to waive the Gradsky de-
fense.
Cathay Bank v. Lee articulated the requirements for an
effective "due process" guaranty waiver. 5 Cathay Bank re-
8. See discussion infra Section V. This position is presented in the alter-
native to the opinion in Section IV that a guaranty of a nonrecourse loan is a
sham.
9. 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790 (Ct. App. 1995).
10. Id. at 800.
11. Huene v. Cribb, 98 P. 78, 80 (Cal. Ct. App. 1908); BERNHARDT, supra
note 1, § 2.1, at 51.
12. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580d (West 1976 & Supp. 1996).
13. Union Bank v. Gradsky, 71 Cal. Rptr. 64 (Ct. App. 1968).
14. Id. at 65.
15. Cathay Bank v. Lee, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 420 (Ct. App. 1993).
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stated the traditional rule that a lender only may enforce a
waiver that is intentional, explicit, and informs of its legal
consequences. 1" In addition, section 2856(d) of the California
Civil Code codifies "safe harbor" language enabling the
lender to impose an effective Gradsky waiver. 7 Many guar-
anties drafted prior to Cathay Bank fail to articulate enforce-
able Gradsky waivers, and counsel should be alert to exam-
ine such guaranties before opining as to enforceability.
In sum, if a lender proceeds by nonjudicial foreclosure
and seeks a deficiency from the guarantor, the guarantor can
invoke the Gradsky defense, unless that defense has been
waived via an intentional, specific, and informed waiver, or
via statutory "safe harbor" language.
B. Judicial Foreclosure and the Right to a Fair Value
Hearing
Alternatively, after a valid default by the developer (or
other prime obligor), the lender may choose to enforce its lien
on the property by judicial foreclosure, rather than by nonju-
dicial foreclosure. When proceeding by judicial foreclosure, a
lender obtains a judgment ordering the sale of the property, a
sale is conducted by a levying officer, and the sale proceeds
are applied toward reduction of the prime obligor's debt.8
A disadvantage to the lender of judicial foreclosure is
that it grants the borrower a one-year statutory option to re-
deem the property for the loan balance and attorney's fees
and costs following the judicial foreclosure sale. 9 Nonethe-
less, a lender may opt for judicial foreclosure because this
method may permit the lender to obtain a deficiency judg-
ment against the borrower where the proceeds of the sale of
the property are inadequate to satisfy the debt.2"
Assuming judicial foreclosure is proper, but the sale pro-
ceeds do not satisfy the debt, the lender may seek a defi-
ciency from the prime obligor.2' However, under the fair
16. See id.
17. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2856(b) (West Supp. 1996).
18. BERNHARDT, supra note 1, § 3.1, at 105.
19. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 726(e), 729.010-729.090 (West Supp. 1996).
20. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726(b) (West 1980 & Supp. 1996); see also CAL.
CIv. PROC. CODE § 580b (West Supp. 1996). However, the lender is precluded
from obtaining a deficiency in cases involving nonpurchase money secured debt.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b.
21. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726(b).
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value protections of section 726(b) of the California Code of
Civil Procedure, a lender's recovery for a deficiency from the
prime obligor is limited to the difference between the unpaid
balance of the secured note (plus expenses) and the adjudi-
cated fair value of the property. But for the limitation under
section 726(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, a lender could
bid less than the fair value at the foreclosure sale, and then
obtain a "full deficiency"22 from the prime obligor."2
Because of the fair value limitations contained in section
726(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, lenders often seek to
obtain the difference between the foreclosure proceeds and
the fair value (the "shortfall") from the personal guarantor.
Stated another way, lenders in California routinely require
developers to personally guaranty development loans to de-
velopers' corporations, so that lenders may attempt to avoid
the fair value protections of section 726(b) of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The issue then is, should the protections of sec-
tion 726(b) apply not only to prime obligors, but also to guar-
antors?
24
C. History and Purpose of Antideficiency Legislation
The antideficiency legislation described above has its
roots in the Great Depression. In the 1930s, California's an-
tideficiency scheme was revised to protect prime obligors who
lost real property through foreclosures.25 Before 1933, a
lender holding a mortgage on real property was required to
exhaust its security before enforcing the debt.26 After ex-
hausting the security by foreclosure, however, the lender
could then obtain a deficiency judgment against the prime
obligor for the difference between the amount of indebtedness
and the amount realized on the sale.27 Thus, during the
Great Depression, a lender was frequently able to purchase
the secured property at a foreclosure sale for a depressed
price, and then hold the prime obligor for a full deficiency. 8
22. Full deficiency is understood as the difference between the unpaid bal-
ance of the secured note plus expenses and the amount produced at the sale.
See infra note 43.
23. See discussion infra Section II.C.
24. See discussion infra Section III.
25. Palm v. Schilling, 244 Cal. Rptr. 600, 603 (Ct. App. 1988).
26. Cornelison v. Kornbluth, 542 P.2d 981, 988 (Cal. 1975).
27. Id.
28. Id.
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The cumulative effect often amounted to a double recovery
because the lender got both the land (with value greater than
the bid price) and the deficiency proceeds.
To alleviate this unfair result and to prevent spiraling
downturns of real estate in bad markets, the California Leg-
islature enacted the fair value protections of section 726(b)
(applicable to judicial foreclosure sales) and section 580a
(applicable to nonjudicial foreclosure sales) of the California
Code of Civil Procedure29 in 1933 in order to correct the de-
pressed economic conditions. 0 The Legislature additionally
enacted section 580b of the Code of Civil Procedure,' which
bars deficiency judgments on purchase money mortgages
whether foreclosure is nonjudicial or judicial. 2 Moreover,
section 580d of the Code of Civil Procedure was enacted to
prevent deficiency judgments after nonjudicial foreclosures.3
D. The Sham Guaranty Doctrine
The legislative policies of the antideficiency legislation 4
should be upheld regardless of any creative or unique struc-
turing of loan transactions by lenders or other parties.
Where guaranty contracts are effectively used to avoid the
antideficiency legislation protections, the same spiraling de-
cline in property values that the legislature intended to pre-
vent occurs. Thus, California courts will closely scrutinize
any guaranty contract to determine whether it is a "sham."5
A guaranty of one's own credit is a nullity and will not
circumvent antideficiency rules. A transaction schemed by
the lender to appear to be a third party guaranty transaction
29. CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 580a (West 1976 & Supp. 1996).
30. Cornelison, 542 P.2d at 988-89; see also CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 580a
(West 1976 & Supp. 1996) (addressing fair value recovery following a private
foreclosure sale).
31. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b (West 1976 & Supp. 1996). A purchase
money note under section 580b of the California Code of Civil Procedure does
not include third party financing of dwellings for more than four families that
are not owner occupied. Id.
32. Id.
33. BERNHARDT, supra note 1, § 4.1, at 185.
34. See discussion supra Section I.C.
35. See Charles A. Hansen, Recent Developments Concerning Antideficiency
Protection, the Full Credit Bid Rule, and Guaranties of Real Property-Secured
Transactions, in EMERGING ISSUES IN FORECLOSURES, GUARANTIES AND OTHER
REMEDIES 137, 177-85 (Continuing Education of the Bar ed., 1996) [hereinafter
Hansen, Recent Developments 1996].
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will not generate guarantor liability. 6 For example, if the
lender structures a transaction by requiring the borrower to
create a corporation to act as the prime obligor with the bor-
rower individually issuing a loan guaranty, the court may re-
gard that structure as a sham and refuse enforcement of the
guaranty on the theory that de facto there is only one bor-
rower and that borrower is entitled to antideficiency protec-
tion.37
E. Suretyship Defenses: Sections 2845, 2848, 2849, and
2809 of the California Civil Code
In addition to antideficiency legislation, the suretyship
sections of the California Civil Code directly provide impor-
tant rights and defenses to guarantors. A lender who chooses
to proceed directly against a guarantor after default without
first foreclosing on the security will, in the absence of full re-
covery, be precluded from additional recovery by sections
2845, 2848 and 2849 of the Civil Code.38 Section 2845 of the
Civil Code grants a guarantor the right to require a lender to
first proceed against the prime obligor or the security. Sec-
tions 2848 and 2849 of the Civil Code grant a guarantor the
right to be subrogated to the lender's position, and thus ac-
quire the secured property where the guarantor is sued by
the lender and the debt is satisfied without a foreclosure."
Further, section 2809 of the Civil Code precludes collec-
tion to the extent that the guarantor's obligation is either
"larger in amount" or "more burdensome" than that of a
prime obligor. 40 Unique applications of this defense are dis-
cussed in detail below in Sections V and VI.
DISCUSSION
II. GRADSKY ESTOPPEL DEFENSE
If a prime obligor defaults on a note secured by a deed of
trust, the secured lender may choose to proceed by nonjudi-
36. See Union Bank v. Dorn, 61 Cal. Rptr. 893 (Ct. App. 1967); see also dis-
cussion infra Section IV, regarding the "sham guaranty doctrine."
37. Valinda Builders, Inc. v. Bissner, 40 Cal. Rptr. 745 (Ct. App. 1964); see
also discussion infra Section IV, regarding the "sham guaranty doctrine."
38. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2845, 2848, 2849 (West 1993).
39. Id.
40. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2809 (West 1993).
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cial foreclosure. In that case, section 580d of the California
Code of Civil Procedure prevents the lender from collecting a
deficiency judgment from the prime obligor."' Moreover, the
Gradsky defense precludes the lender from obtaining a defi-
ciency from the guarantor (unless the guarantor has waived
this defense).42
The rationale of Gradsky is that a lender is estopped
from recovering a deficiency judgment43 from a guarantor
when the lender elects nonjudicial foreclosure, because the
nonjudicial foreclosure exculpates the prime obligor from all
future actions on his debt, thereby cutting off a guarantor's
subrogation rights." The Gradsky estoppel defense properly
shifts the risk of loss to the party with control of the situa-
tion-the lender.45
41. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580d (West 1976 & Supp. 1996).
42. See Union Bank v. Gradsky, 71 Cal. Rptr. 64 (Ct. App. 1968).
43. BERNHARDT, supra note 1, § 4.13, at 196 (defining deficiency judgment
as "the difference between the unpaid balance of the secured debt (plus ex-
penses) and the amount produced by the sale [i.e., 'full deficiency']"). But see
discussion infra Section III regarding a guarantor's right to limit a deficiency to
the difference between the unpaid balance of the secured debt and the fair
value of the secured property pursuant to a fair value hearing under section
580a of the California Code of Civil Procedure or section 726(b) of the California
Code of Civil Procedure.
44. Cathay Bank v. Lee, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 420 (Ct. App. 1993). The court
opined that:
[A] lender is estopped to recover a deficiency judgment against a guar-
antor when it elects a particular remedy ([such as] nonjudicial foreclo-
sure) which cuts off the guarantor's subrogation rights against the
debtor. Thus, even though California's antideficiency statute [section
580d of the California Code of Civil Procedure] does not protect guar-
antors directly, as a practical matter the "Gradsky defense" precludes
deficiency judgments against them unless the lender elects the rela-
tively cumbersome remedy of judicial foreclosure.
Id. (citing Union Bank v. Gradsky, 71 Cal. Rptr. 64 (Ct. App. 1968)).
45. Kathleen Abdallah, Guarantors and the California Antideficiency Legis-
lation: Is There Room Under the Umbrella of Protection?, 20 PAC. L.J. 127, 141
(1988). Abdallah explains why the Gradsky court recognized that the lender,
not the guarantor, was ultimately liable for deficiency resulting from lender's
election to proceed by nonjudicial foreclosure:
First, both the creditor and the guarantor were barred from recovering
a personal judgment from the principal debtor after a nonjudicial fore-
closure. Second, if the creditor elected to foreclose judicially ... both
the creditor and guarantor would have the right to obtain a deficiency
judgment against the principal debtor. Third, the creditor alone had
the option of choosing whether to preserve the right to a deficiency
judgment against the principal debtor by electing to judicially fore-
close. Finally, the creditor had a statutory duty not to impair a guar-
antor's remedy against the principal.
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Although the Gradsky defense has typically been applied
in the context of nonjudicial foreclosures, the logic of Gradsky
also applies to estop a lender from obtaining a deficiency
judgment from a guarantor where a lender proceeds by judi-
cial foreclosure, but elects not to apply for a fair value hear-
ing under section 726(b) of the Civil Code" within three
months of the foreclosure sale.47
A. Cathay Bank Articulates the Standard for Testing the
Validity of a Gradsky Defense Waiver
If a guaranty effectively waives the Gradsky defense (i.e.,
waives his subrogation rights), the guarantor may be person-
ally liable for a deficiency judgment following a nonjudicial
foreclosure by the lender. Thus, the due process adequacy of
the waiver language is key to analyzing the liability of the
guarantor. The court in Cathay Bank v. Lee articulated the
Id.
46. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726(b) (West 1980 & Supp. 1996). This section
states:
[Ulpon application of the plaintiff filed at any time within three
months of the date of the [judicial] foreclosure sale and after a hearing
thereon at which the court shall take evidence at which hearing either
party may present evidence as to the fair value of the real prop-
erty... therein sold as of the date of sale, the court shall render a
money judgment against the defendant[s]... for the amount by which
the amount of the indebtedness with interest and costs of levy and sale
and of action exceeds the fair value of the real property... therein
sold as of the date of the sale.
Id.
47. BERNHARDT, supra note 1, § 8.14, at 409. This section states:
There is no reason to believe.., that.., a scheme [by a lender to ob-
tain a deficiency from a guarantor without applying for a fair value
hearing] would work, because the logic of Gradsky would apply. Fol-
lowing the [judicial] foreclosure sale, a deficiency judgment cannot be
entered against the trustor except after a timely fair-value hearing. If
the beneficiary could underbid and recover the entire difference from
the guarantor, the guarantor would be left with an unrecoverable loss
due solely to the beneficiary's action. Furthermore, failure to hold a
fair-value hearing within three months after the sale would bar any
recovery against the trustor, imposing the entire loss (not just the loss
of the difference between the amount bid and the fair value) on the
guarantor. This situation arises only because the beneficiary has
credit-bid both less than it is owed and (possibly) less than the prop-
erty is worth; thus, the consequences must fall on the beneficiary, who
can credit-bid a larger amount, rather than on the guarantor, who
must make a cash bid.
1998]
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requirements for an effective waiver.48
Cathay Bank restated the traditional rule that an en-
forceable waiver must be intentional, explicit, and inform of
its legal consequences.49 Thus, a valid waiver must explain
the precise nature of the guarantor's defense and the fact
that it is being waived. ° Moreover, the Cathay Bank court
stated: (1) that the lender has the burden to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that any waiver is informed;"' and
(2) that ambiguities are constructed against the drafter, who
is usually the lender.
B. Section 2856 of the California Civil Code.
Section 2856(d) of the California Civil Code 3 creates
"safe harbor" language that a lender may adopt to ensure an
enforceable Gradsky waiver. However, Cathay Bank is still
dispositive regarding the adequacy of waivers if the language
in the guaranty does not mirror this statutory language.
The relatively recent appellate court case, River Bank
America v. Diller," suggests that Cathay Bank was amelio-
48. Cathay Bank v. Lee, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 420 (Ct. App. 1993).
49. See infra Section II.B, discussing how section 2856 of the California
Civil Code does not abrogate Cathay Bank.
[Ilt is not enough merely to imply (however strongly or unavoidably) to
the guarantor that he or she has a "right" to compel the lender to se-
lect a particular remedy (judicial foreclosure [followed by a fair value
hearing]) in the event the principal obligor fails to pay the loan. This
does not spell out the true legal consequences of what would otherwise
happen if the lender selects another remedy (nonjudicial foreclosure
[or judicial foreclosure, but failure to conduct a fair value hearing]).
The guarantor is not told that if the lender selects nonjudicial foreclo-
sure [or judicial foreclosure without a fair value hearing], he or she
will have a defense to a deficiency judgment, and it is that defense
which the guarantor is now being asked to give up in advance ....
Cathay Bank, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 423 (emphasis in original).
50. Cathay Bank, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 423 ("To find a waiver of the Gradsky
defense ... one must go beyond the actual words and imply into them two more
ideas, namely: (1) that the destruction of subrogation rights creates a defense
to a deficiency judgment, and (2) the guarantor is now waiving that specific de-
fense.").
51. Id. ("[TIhe burden is on the party claiming the waiver to prove it by
clear and convincing evidence....").
52. Id. at 423 ("[Almbiguities would be construed against the party who se-
lected the language, who normally is the lender, [and]... if the matter is argu-
able, the doubt should be resolved against [enforcing] waiver.").
53. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580d (West 1976 & Supp. 1996).
54. 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790 (Ct. App. 1995).
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rated by section 2856 of the Civil Code.55 The legislative his-
tory of section 2856 of the Civil Code," however, indicates
that Cathay Bank is still controlling law.
Section 2856 of the Civil Code was enacted pursuant to
California Assembly Bill 3101 ("AB 3101")."' The original
version of section 2 of AB 3101 contained language designed
to abrogate Cathay Bank,5" which drew sharp criticism, in-
cluding several letters to California representatives.59 An
August 4, 1994 letter from Earl Lui, Staff Attorney, Consum-
ers Union, to the bill's author (Assemblymember Louis Cal-
dera) stated: "[O]ur more general concern is with the bill's
apparent weakening of basic principles of waiver law. A
waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right.
We believe the Cathay Bank court correctly invalidated the
waiver at issue in that case."' °
An August 11, 1994 letter from Doug deVries, President,
Legislative Department, California Trial Lawyers Associa-
tion, to Assemblymember Caldera stated: "AB 3101 flies in
the face of settled anti-deficiency and waiver law. It creates
an exception to the rule that a waiver must be an intentional
relinquishment of a known right."6
Further, an August 4, 1994 letter from Thomas K. Ban-
non, Executive Vice-President for the California Apartment
Association, to Senator Bill Lockyer stated:
55. River Bank America v. Diller, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790 (Ct. App. 1995)
("[Allthough [Cathay Bank] purports to be 'declarative of existing law' it is clear
the Legislature enacted section 2856 to ameliorate the strict rule laid down in
Cathay Bank ... Cathay Bank... has arguably been eroded by the recently
enacted legislation [CAL. CIV. CODE § 2856].).
56. CAL. CIv. CODE § 2856 (West Supp. 1996).
57. 1994 Cal. Stat. 1204 (A.B. 3101) § 1. The version of section 2856 of the
California Civil Code enacted in 1994 was repealed by 1996 chapter 1013 § 1
and another section 2856 was enacted in 1996 in its place. 1996 Cal. Stats.
1013 (A.B. 2585) § 1. The safe harbor language of section 2856(d) in the 1996
version is the same as section 2856(b) in the 1994 version.
58. Section 2 of AB 3101, as amended in the Senate on June 21, 1994
stated:
It is the intent of the late legislature in enacting Section 2856 of the
Civil Code to abrogate the decision of the California Court of Appeal in
Cathay Bank... which appears to establish requirements for waivers
of the rights of sureties that go beyond those required under state
law ....
1994 Cal. Stat. 1204 (A.B. 3101) § 2 (emphasis omitted).
59. See letters at Appendices A-C (original letters on file with author).
60. See letter at Appendix A.
61. See letter at Appendix B.
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The standard set out by the Cathay decision.., is consis-
tent with the principle that a party can only waive a right
or defense if he or she knows and understands that the
right or defense is available in the first place.... It is our
position that the Cathay ruling should be allowed to
stand, and that any statutory standard for Gradsky waiv-
ers crafted through legislation should be prospective in
application.62
Following receipt of the above letters, the Legislature
deleted the "abrogation" language from the final version of
AB 3101. The Legislature's rejection of language in the
original version of section 2 of AB 3101 (designed to abrogate
Cathay Bank) is persuasive to the conclusion that Civil Code
section 2856 does not abrogate Cathay Bank.63 Additionally,
the Legislature expressly stated that section 2856 of the Civil
Code "do[es] not represent a change in, but [is] merely de-
clarative of, existing law [Cathay Bank]."' Thus, the Legis-
lature revealed its intent that Cathay Bank remain in effect,
despite the "safe harbor" provision provided in the new leg-
islation.
C. Section 2856 of the California Civil Code Should Not Be
Applied Retroactively to Guaranties Executed Prior to
January 1, 1997
Further, section 2856 of the California Civil Code on its
face does not apply retroactively to guaranties executed prior
to January 1, 1997.65 Accordingly, the adequacy of all Grad-
sky waivers in guaranties executed prior to January 1, 1997
should be tested by the controlling case law (i.e., Cathay
Bank and related authority), not the safe harbor language of
section 2856(d) of the Civil Code.
62. See letter at Appendix C.
63. "'[Tlhe rejection by the Legislature of a specific provision contained in
an act as originally introduced is most persuasive to the conclusion that the act
should not be construed to include the omitted provision." Madrid v. Justice
Court, 125 Cal. Rptr. 348, 351 (Ct. App. 1975) (quoting Rich v. State Bd. of Op-
tometry, 45 Cal. Rptr. 512, 522 (Ct. App. 1965)).
64. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2856 (historical and statutory notes) (West Supp.
1996).
65. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2856(f) (West Supp. 1996).
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III. THE FAIR VALUE PROTECTIONS OF THE ANTIDEFICIENCY
LEGISLATION AFFORDED PRIME OBLIGORS SHOULD BE
AVAILABLE TO GUARANTORS FOLLOWING A JUDICIAL
FORECLOSURE
A. Direct Right to a Fair Value Hearing Under Section
726(b) of the California Code of Civil Procedure
If a prime obligor validly defaults on a note secured by a
deed of trust, a lender may choose to proceed by judicial fore-
closure, rather than by nonjudicial foreclosure. If judicial
foreclosure is chosen, section 726(b) of the California Code of
Civil Procedure gives a prime obligor the right to a fair value
hearing following the judicial foreclosure." Under section
726(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, a lender's recovery for a
deficiency from a prime obligor is limited to the difference be-
tween the unpaid balance of the secured note [plus expenses]
and the fair value of the property.67 Without these protec-
tions, a lender could bid less than the fair value at the fore-
closure sale, and then obtain a "full deficiency" from the
prime obligor (for the difference between the unpaid balance
of the secured note [plus expenses] and the amount produced
at the sale).68
California courts have generally held that only a prime
obligor, not a guarantor, is entitled to antideficiency legisla-
tion protections such as the right to a fair value hearing.69
However, the fair value protections of section 726(b) of the
Code of Civil Procedure should be extended to guarantors.
Many prominent real property commentators note that
there are several reasons why a guarantor should be entitled
to a section 726(b) fair value hearing following a judicial fore-
closure: (1) a lender should be prevented from collecting a
66. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 726(b) (West 1980 & Supp. 1996).
67. Id.
68. See discussion supra Section II.C.
69. SHENEMAN, supra note 1, § 8.17, at 8-68. However, in 1995, the fourth
district California court of appeal, held that the fair market value provisions of
section 580a of the California Code of Civil Procedure applied to guarantors in
an action to collect an unpaid debt balance following a nonjudicial foreclosure.
See Bank of So. California v. Dombrow, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 656 (Ct. App. 1995).
Although this case was decertified by the California Supreme Court (March 18,
1996) 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 3023, "a logical and well-reasoned decision de-
spite vacatur is always persuasive authority." In re Finley, 160 B.R. 882, 898
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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double recovery (by underbidding the property at the foreclo-
sure sale and then holding a guarantor liable for a full defi-
ciency);"° (2) the broad language of section 726(b) of the Code
of Civil Procedure (stating that if "any defendant" is person-
ally liable for the debt, the fair value limitations apply to the
debt) indicates that section 726(b) of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure is available to both prime obligor and guarantor defen-
dants;7 (3) earlier judicial decisions suggesting that section
726(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure was inapplicable to
guarantors, may be dismissed as they were based on anti-
quated law; 2 and (4) granting guarantors the fair value
rights of section 726(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure fur-
thers the policies driving the antideficiency legislation and
suretyship law, such as minimizing overvaluation and shift-
ing the risk of a depressed market to the lender.73
70. MILLER & STARR, supra note 1, § 9:200, at 637-39; see also MILLER &
STARR, supra note 1, § 9:200, at 199 n.82 (Supp. 1998).
71. MILLER & STARR, supra note 1, § 9:200, at 199 n.82 (Supp. 1998) ("CCP
§ 726 states that if 'any defendant' is personally liable for the debt, the fair
value limitations apply to the debt. Thus, the limitation should apply to a
money judgment against a guarantor.").
72. MILLER & STARR, supra note 1, § 9:200, at 637-38. To wit:
The cases decided before the abolition of the surety-guarantor distinc-
tion held that the creditor was not limited to the excess of the obliga-
tion owed over the (fair value) of the security when pursuing the guar-
antor's liability. However, subsequent cases have reaffirmed the
earlier decisions without reference to the abolition of the surety-
guarantor distinction. The courts consider the guaranty contract as
any other additional security received by the creditor, and the (fair-
value) limitations do not hinder the creditor in pursuing other types of
additional security. However, because of subsequent expansion of the
(fair-value) limitations, the policy of these limitations may be extended
to protect the guarantor.
Id.
73. Abdallah, supra note 45, at 161. This section states:
The policy of the antideficiency scheme and suretyship law favor
granting a guarantor a fair value hearing on the real property security
after foreclosure. Accordingly, a debtor will never be liable for a defi-
ciency judgment over and above the fair value of the real property se-
curity, and the liability of a guarantor will be no more burdensome
than that of the principal debtor... [A] fair value hearing will keep
overvaluation to a minimum and the risk of a depressed market on the
creditor and not the guarantor.
Id. See also Abdallah, supra note 45, at 161-62 ("While the California antidefi-
ciency legislation was enacted to protect principal debtors from personal liabili-
ties on debts secured by real property, the courts must recognize similar pro-
tections to guarantors under suretyship law."); and, BERNHARDT, supra note 1,
§ 8.14 at 409:
It is probably... true that a creditor who underbids at its foreclosure
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In addition to the well-reasoned positions of the Califor-
nia real property law commentators, the Nevada Supreme
Court, in the face of antideficiency legislation, held that the
fair value protections of antideficiency legislation are directly
available to guarantors. 4 The Nevada Supreme Court, in
First Interstate Bank of Nevada v. Shields, stated that the
court is "now convinced that it is unsound to deny guarantors
the benefits of such legislation."75 In Nevada, Shields grants
guarantors the right to a fair value hearing under Nevada's
antideficiency scheme (which is comparable to California) to
prevent lenders from: seeking a double recovery;"6 circum-
venting legislative purposes;" manipulating sources of recov-
ery in order to obtain amounts from guarantors which are
greater than the balance of the debts due;"8 unfairly enriching
themselves at the expense of guarantors;"8 and thwarting
general principles of guaranty law.8°
sale becomes subject to a fair-value defense by the guarantor as well as
by the trustor .... The trustor clearly has fair-value protection, [and
although] it is unsettled whether the beneficiary can avoid complying
with the fair-value rules by seeking a deficiency judgment only against
the guarantor[,] [t~here is no reason to believe.., that such a scheme
would work ....
Id.
74. First Interstate Bank of Nevada v. Shields, 730 P.2d 429 (Nev. 1986).
75. Id. at 431.
76. Id. ("Nevada's deficiency legislation is designed to achieve fairness to all
parties to a transaction secured in whole or in part by realty .... [Obligors are
assured that creditors in Nevada may not reap a windfall at an obligor's ex-
pense by acquiring the secured realty at a bid price unrelated to the fair mar-
ket value of the property and thereafter proceeding against available obligors
for the difference between such a deflated price and the balance of the debt.").
77. Id. ("It is irrefutably clear that the salutary purposes of the legislative
scheme for recovering legitimate deficiencies would be attenuated, if not en-
tirely circumvented in specific instances, by denying guarantors, or any other
form of obligor, the protection provided by the deficiency statutes. A lender in
Nevada is not privileged to manipulate sources of recovery in order to realize
debt satisfaction in amounts substantially greater than the balance of the debt
due.").
78. Id.
79. First Interstate Bank of Nevada v. Shields, 730 P.2d 429, 431 (Nev.
1986) ("The way would.., be paved for an unscrupulous lender to bid an insig-
nificant price for real property of a true and sufficient value to satisfy the debt
it secured, and then pursue a second essentially full satisfaction from a finan-
cially responsible guarantor. Any less extreme variant from the preceding hy-
pothetical would still unfairly enrich the lender at the expense of the guaran-
tor. We are convinced that the Legislature never intended to facilitate such
scenarios.").
80. Id. ("[The] holding [of this court] is consistent with general principles of
guaranty law. As a general rule, the payment or other satisfaction or extin-
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In sum, if the commentators are right and the Nevada
Supreme Court is followed, both California prime obligors
and guarantors should be entitled to the section 726(b) fair
value protections.
IV. THE SHAM GUARANTY DOCTRING PROTECTS DE FACTO
PRIME OBLIGORS
The legislative policies of the antideficiency legislation
will be honored regardless of any creative or unique loan
transaction structure. Accordingly, if a guaranty has been
used to obtain a disguised waiver of antideficiency legislation
protections, the guaranty will be characterized as a "sham."8
For example, if a loan transaction is structured so that the
prime obligor/borrower is a general partnership and the
guarantor is an individual partner, then the guaranty will be
treated as a mere sham since the guarantor, as an individual
partner, is primarily obligated for the debts of the partner-
ship.
8 2
Once a guaranty is found to be a "sham," then the guar-
antor will be treated as a "de facto prime obligor." The dis-
tinction between mere guarantor and de facto prime obligor
is significant for two main reasons. First, a de facto prime
obligor is entitled to the direct protections of the antidefi-
ciency legislation (i.e., the section 580d of the California Code
of Civil Procedure defense to liability for the deficiency after
a nonjudicial foreclosure)." Second, a de facto prime obligor's
waivers of antideficiency statute protections are generally
unenforceable.84
guishment of the principal debt or obligation by the principle or anyone for him
discharges the guarantor.").
81. Hansen, Recent Developments 1996, supra note 35, at 177-78.
82. Union Bank v. Dorn, 61 Cal. Rptr. 893 (Ct. App. 1967).
83. Everts v. Matteson, 132 P.2d 476, 482 (Cal. 1942) ("[I]f... the appel-
lants... are liable as principal obligors and not as guarantors of the indebted-
ness, they clearly come within the [fair value] provisions of section 580a of the
Code of Civil Procedure and are entitled to its benefits."). Note that the sham
guaranty analysis is particularly important to a guarantor who has waived the
Gradsky defense, because if that guarantor achieves characterization as a de
facto prime obligor, he may directly invoke the nonwaivable defense under sec-
tion 580d of the California Code of Civil Procedure defense to liability for the
deficiency. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580d (West 1976 & Supp. 1996).
84. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2953 (West 1993). This section states:
[Any express agreement made or entered into by a borrower at the
time of or in connection with the making of or renewing of any loan se-
cured by a deed of trust.... whereby the borrower agrees to waive the
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A. If Guarantor Is Actually a De Facto Prime Obligor, Then
Guaranty Is a Sham
Traditional analysis of the sham guaranty doctrine fo-
cuses on the partner guarantor, shareholder guarantor or
trustee guarantor, each of which are briefly discussed be-
low,85 but as this section explains, a guaranty of a nonre-
course note also is a sham. 6
1. Partner Guarantor
If the transaction is structured so that the guarantor is a
general partner and the borrower is a general partnership or
a limited partnership, then the guarantor is actually a de
facto prime obligor because he is primarily obligated for the
debt. 7 However, "[i]t remains uncertain how the sham guar-
anty doctrine will be applied to [guarantors who are] limited
partners .... .88
2. Shareholder Guarantor
If the transaction is structured so that a guarantor is the
alter ego of a corporate borrower, then the guarantor may be
treated as a de facto prime obligor.89 A court may examine
the traditional factors considered by a court to determine
whether the guarantor is a corporation's alter ego,90 but the
salient factor probably is whether the lender tacitly engi-
neered the structure of the transaction to circumvent antide-
ficiency protections.'
3. Trustee Guarantor
Moreover, a court may treat a trustee who guaranties
rights.... conferred upon him ... by Sections 580a or 726 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, shall be void and of no effect.
Id.
85. See discussion infra Part.IV.A.1-3.
86. See discussion infra Part IV.A.4.
87. Union Bank, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 894; Riddle v. Lushing, 21 Cal. Rptr. 902,
904-05 (Ct. App. 1962).
88. Hansen, Recent Developments 1996, supra note 35, at 178.
89. Valinda Builders, Inc. v. Bissner, 40 Cal. Rptr. 735, 738-39 (Ct. App.
1964).
90. See Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 806,
813-15 (Ct. App. 1962).
91. Hansen, Recent Developments 1996, supra note 35, at 178 (citing Val-
inda Builders, 40 Cal. Rptr. 735 (Ct. App. 1964)).
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the trust's debt as a de facto prime obligor.92
4. Guarantor of Nonrecourse Note
Finally, if the transaction is structured so that the loan
is nonrecourse as to the prime obligor, the guarantor of the
nonrecourse note should also be treated as a de facto prime
obligor, entitled to the direct protections of the antideficiency
legislation. A nonrecourse note, by its terms, generally re-
leases a debtor/signator to a note from any personal obliga-
tion to pay any amount to a lender. Since a debtor/signator
to the note has no legal obligation to pay the note (because
the note is nonrecourse), the ostensible guarantor (as the
only person with liability on the loan) becomes a de facto
prime obligor.
The court in Roberts v. Reynolds stated that "'the words
"guaranty" or "guarantee" do not always import a contract of
guaranty.'93 Rather, such words may be used with reference
to an obligation which is primary in nature as distinguished
from one which is secondary."9 4 Thus, even if a document is
entitled "Guaranty," that contract may "import[ ] an original
obligation on the part of the person executing such con-
tract."9 Where an ostensible contract of guaranty creates a
"primary liability," and not a "collateral undertaking," then
the ostensible guarantor is in fact a primary obligor.9"
A lender cannot evade antideficiency protections by us-
ing novel combinations of debtor/guarantor/security ar-
rangements in ways which violate or skate very close to the
edge of the policies underpinning these rules and their non-
waivability.97 "Such sophisticated structuring is arguably in
92. Torrey Pines Bank v. Hoffman, 282 Cal. Rptr. 354 (Ct. App. 1991).
93. Roberts v. Reynolds, 28 Cal. Rptr. 261, 266 (Ct. App. 1963).
94. Id. at 266 (citations omitted).
95. Meyer v. Moore, 237 P. 550, 552 (Cal. Ct. App. 1925).
96. Kilbride v. Moss, 45 P. 812, 812-13 (Cal. 1896). In Kilbride, a purchase
of the capital stock of a corporation was made at the request of a large stock-
holder who, in order to induce the purchase, verbally promised to return the
purchaser's money for the stock should the stock become worthless. Id. The
court held that the promise was an original one and not a guaranty, drawing a
distinction between a promise which is original and one which is only collateral
to the undertaking of a third party: "[a] contract of guaranty is a collateral un-
dertaking. It cannot exist without the presence of a main or substantive liabil-
ity to which it is collateral." Id.; see also City Nat. Bank v. Lemco Mfg. Co., 207
P. 509, 509 (Cal. Ct. App. 1922).
97. See Hansen, Recent Developments 1996, supra note 35, at 177-78.
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violation of the ringing pronouncements against circumven-
tion found in such recent cases as Simon,... O'Neil,... and
Westinghouse ....98 Moreover, "'[c]ourts consistently strike
down schemes aimed at avoiding the deficiency legislation by
illusory changes in form. A flimsy avoidance device based
upon an intermediate surety would have no chance of suc-
cess.'"
99
Accordingly, since the guarantor of a nonrecourse note
has primary liability, such guarantor is really a de facto
prime obligor entitled to all the benefits connected with that
status.
B. Significance of a Court Finding that Guaranty Is a Sham
and that Guarantor Is a Prime Obligor
As previously stated, when a court finds that a guaranty
is a sham, the guarantor/de facto prime obligor is entitled to
the direct protections of the antideficiency legislation.' ° This
right is particularly important to a guarantor who has effec-
tively waived his Gradsky defense' 01 or surety defenses under
sections 2809, 2845, 2848, and 2849 of the California Civil
Code.' 2 Another advantage of prime obligor status is that a
prime obligor's waiver of antideficiency protections almost
98. Charles Hansen, Recent Developments and Trends Concerning Antidefi-
ciency Issues; Judicial Foreclosure; The Full Credit Bid Rule; and Guaranties of
Real Property Secured Transactions, in EMERGING ISSUES IN PRIVATE AND
JUDICIAL FORECLOSURES, DEEDS IN LIEU, AND ACTIONS OR GUARANTIES, 186-87
(Continuing Education of the Bar ed., 1995) [hereinafter Hansen, Recent Devel-
opments 1995] (citing Simon v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 428 (Ct. App.
1992); O'Neil v. General Sec. Corp., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 712, 720 (Ct. App. 1992);
Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Barton, 789 F. Supp. 1043, 1045-56 (C.D. Cal.
1992)). In Westinghouse Credit, the general partner who guarantied the part-
nership note was found to be a de facto prime obligor entitled to antideficiency
protections, even though the loan guarantied was nonrecourse. Westinghouse
Credit Corp., 789 F. Supp. at 1046. The lender unsuccessfully argued that be-
cause the loan was nonrecourse, the general partner was relieved of principal
liability on the debt, and therefore, was not a prime obligor entitled to antidefi-
ciency protection. Id. The court held, however, this device/circumvention did
not avoid section 580d of the California Code of Civil Procedure: "the result of
allowing a non-recourse provision to qualify a general partner separately a
guarantor would be to circumvent the legislative intent of the anti-deficiency
statutes." Id.
99. Heckes v. Sapp, 40 Cal. Rptr. 485, 489 (Ct. App. 1964) (citations omit-
ted).
100. Everts v. Matteson, 132 P.2d 476, 482 (Cal. 1942).
101. See discussion supra Section II regarding Gradsky defense.
102. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2809, 2845, 2848, 2849 (West 1993); see discussion
supra Section I.E. regarding these defenses.
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always is void as against public policy;"°3 whereas a mere
guarantor's waiver of suretyship statute defenses is probably
enforceable, 4 unless the waiver language is inadequate.
C. De Facto Prime Obligor's Waiver of Antideficiency
Legislation Defenses
If a lender seeks to hold a guarantor liable for a defi-
ciency after valid default of the debtor, but the guarantor
successfully counters that the guaranty is a "sham" and that
the guarantor is a de facto prime obligor, certain waivers in
the guaranty may be unenforceable.
At the time of making or renewing a loan, a "prime obli-
gor's" contemporaneous waivers of sections 580a, 580d, and
726 of the California Code of Civil Procedure are invalid.'
The rationale posited for this rule is the lender's superior
bargaining power at the time the loan is made."
Although the law regarding waiver at the time of making
or renewing the loan is well-settled, "[t]he law is less clear
regarding whether the trust deed beneficiary [or de facto
prime obligor] can obtain a subsequent waiver of the antide-
ficiency protections after the initial loan is made."0 7 One
commentator notes that the enforceability of a waiver under
section 2953 of the Civil Code depends on whether a subse-
quent waiver is characterized as an "extension of time"
(waiver possibly enforceable) or a "renewal" (waiver void).'
103. See discussion infra Section V.C.
104. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3268 (West 1993).
105. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2953 (West 1993) ("Any express agreement made or
entered into by a borrower at the time of or in connection with the making of or
renewing of any loan secured by a deed of trust .... whereby the borrower
agrees to waive the rights.... conferred upon him... by Sections 580a or 726
of the Code of Civil Procedure, shall be void and of no effect .. "). SHENEMAN,
supra note 1, § 6.15, at 6-68 ("[Section 580d of the Civil Code] also may not be
waived at the outset of the transaction, although §580d is not mentioned by the
antiwaiver statute.").
106. BERNHARDT, supra note 1, § 4.48, at 230 ("California courts have consis-
tently refused to permit waivers of antideficiency protections that are made
contemporaneously with the making of the loan. The courts take the view that,
to obtain a loan, a necessitous borrower will always waive all of his or her
rights at the creditor's insistence.").
107. SHENEMAN, supra note 1, § 6.15, at 6-68.
108. Id. § 6.15, at 6-69 ("The enforceability of a waiver under Civil Code §
2953 depends in part on the distinction between an extension of time on an ex-
isting loan (in which case the waiver may be enforceable) and the renewal of a
loan (in which case a waiver is void). A renewal is 'a separate and distinct con-
tract, the substitution of a new right or obligation for another of the same na-
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Yet, even the distinction between extension of time and a re-
newal is ambiguous.0 9
Salter v. Ulrich suggests that subsequent waivers are
valid because the rights between the lender and prime obli-
gor are already established."' However, Palm v. Schilling
questioned the authority of Salter and notes that the rule es-
poused in Salter is pure dictum."' Moreover, the logic un-
derlying the Salter dictum is easily discredited because a
debtor in dire straits regarding a pre-existing loan is often
more desperate to make concessions to a lender than one
merely seeking a loan."' Accordingly, it is likely that both
contemporaneous and subsequent waivers of antideficiency
protections are invalid.
Nonetheless, even if a court finds that a (de facto) prime
obligor's subsequent waiver of any antideficiency defense is
valid, the guarantor still may challenge the enforceability of
the waiver if it is not knowing and voluntary."'
ture,' and probably implies or requires the execution of a new instrument.")
(citations omitted)).
109. Hansen, Recent Developments 1995, supra note 98, at 155 n.13 ("One of
the most pregnant and poorly-explored issues in this area is the meaning of
loan 'renewal' under Civil Code section 2953. If 'renewal' is defined broadly to
include such events as loan extension, forbearance and modification, waiver by
contract may almost never be possible.").
110. Salter v. Ulrich, 138 P.2d 7, 9 (Cal. 1943). The court stated:
Since necessity often drives debtors to make ruinous concessions when
a loan is needed, section 726 should be applied to protect them and to
prevent a waiver in advance. This reasoning, however, does not apply
after the loan is made, when all rights have been established and there
remains only the enforcement of those rights .... The rule against
waivers in advance has been codified by section 2953 of the Civil
Code .... [S]ection 2953 ... is entirely consistent with the right of a
mortgagor or trustor to make a subsequent waiver, since by its terms
it purports to apply only to a waiver agreement which is exacted in ad-
vance as a condition to the making or renewing of any loan secured by
a mortgage or deed of trust.
Id.
111. Palm v. Schilling, 244 Cal. Rptr. 600, 608 (Ct. App. 1988) ("With the
passage of time Salter's dictum has become the sole authority approving a sub-
sequent contractual waiver of section 726 of the Civil Code. Based on the facts
in Salter and the purposes of deficiency legislation, we have severe reservations
as to the rule's heritage.").
112. BERNHARDr, supra note 1, § 4.49, at 231 ("Presumably, the duress that
might compel the waiver vanishes once the loan has been made, although a
debtor in distress with regard to the existing loan may be in even more desper-
ate straits than one who has not yet borrowed at all." (analyzing Palm v. Schil-
ling, 244 Cal. Rptr. 600 (Ct. App. 1988))).
113. See discussion supra Section II.A.; see also discussion infra Section VI.
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V. SECTION 2809 OF THE CIVIL CODE PREVENTS LENDER
FROM ENFORCING THE GUARANTY OF NONRECOURSE LOAN" 4
An important and frequently litigated suretyship defense
is section 2809 of the California Civil Code, which provides a
defense to a guarantor where a guarantor's obligation is ei-
ther "larger in amount" or "more burdensome" than that of
the prime obligor."5 A complete discussion of this defense is
beyond the scope of this article. However, the article does
address the specific issue raised, but not resolved, in the re-
cent case, River Bank America v. Diller,"' as to "whether sec-
tion 2809 provides a defense to a guarantor who has person-
ally guaranteed a contractual nonrecourse obligation.""7 We
conclude that section 2809 of the Civil Code should exonerate
the guarantor of a nonrecourse note because where the prime
obligor has no personal liability at the time the guaranty is
executed, the guarantor's obligation exceeds the prime obli-
gor's obligation.
The facts in the River Bank America case are similar to
many construction financing deals. In River Bank America,
the developer/prime obligor assumed no personal liability be-
cause the obligation was nonrecourse; therefore, its loss was
limited to the secured property."8 The guarantors, however,
subjected their personal assets to risk by assuming personal
liability.19
The court stated that pursuant to section 2809 of the
Civil Code, the guarantors' obligation was "not larger in
amount" than the prime obligor's because the guarantor's ex-
posure was limited to 20% of the face amount of the note. 20
114. Note that this position is in the alternative to the discussion in Section
IV that a guarantor of a nonrecourse note is a prime obligor and the guaranty
is a sham.
115. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2809 (West 1993) ("The obligation of a surety must be
neither larger in amount nor in another respects more burdensome than that of
the principal; and if in its terms it exceeds it, it is reducible in proportion to the
principal obligation.").
116. 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790 (Ct. App. 1995).
117. Id. at 794-95.
118. Id. at 795 ("[The prime obligors] had absolutely no personal liability for
the.., loan. From the outset, the lender could only proceed against "the
premises." If the proceeds from the sale of "the premises" were insufficient to
satisfy the outstanding debt .... [the lender] had no recourse against other as-
sets not connected to the [secured property].").
119. Id. In this case, the guarantors guaranteed 20% of the face amount of
the notes. Id.
120. River Bank Am., 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 795 (citing CAL. Civ. CODE § 2809
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However, the court found "it... difficult - if not impossible -
to say which of these obligations is 'more burdensome'" under
section 2809 of the Civil Code-the guarantor's personal li-
ability of $3.6 million (20% of the loan); or the prime obligor's
0% personal liability for its $38 million note, but the loss of
its property. 1 ' Yet, the court suggested that where a guaran-
tor guaranties 100% of a loan, the guarantor's personal li-
ability for the deficiency "may be viewed as 'more burden-
some'" than the prime obligor's loss of the secured assets of
the specific project."2
The River Bank America court seemingly failed to under-
stand that the obligations of guarantors of a nonrecourse ob-
ligation are always both "larger in amount" and "more bur-
densome" than that of the nonrecourse prime obligor. At the
time a nonrecourse loan is made to a developer, the loan pro-
ceeds almost always go to purchase the security (for example,
the land). As to the nonrecourse debtor, the transaction can
only be positive-the debtor receives land, yet cannot be held
personally liable to repay the loan. A guarantor of a nonre-
course loan, on the other hand, receives neither the loan pro-
ceeds, nor the land. Rather, the guarantor acquires only the
obligation to repay the loan should the nonrecourse debtor
default. Thus, the guarantor's obligation is greater than the
debtor (the debtor received land) and more burdensome (the
debtor is not personally liable on the loan, whereas the guar-
antor is liable), and accordingly, section 2809 of the Civil
Code precludes guarantor liability.
In a dispositive ruling on this issue, the California Su-
preme Court, in U.S. Leasing Corp. v. Du Pont,"' stated
"'The obligation of a surety must be neither larger in amount
(West 1993)).
121. Id. at 796 ("From a developer's perspective, a loan that subjects his or
her entire net worth to risk may be viewed as 'more burdensome' than a loan
that puts only the assets of a specific project at risk. Here, however, the devel-
opers personally guaranteed only a small portion (20 percent) of the amount
borrowed, and were thus able to limit exposure of their personal assets. By
contrast, although [the prime obligors] had no personal liability for the $38
million loan, they did risk everything they put into the project, including the
land. We are hard pressed to say which of these obligations is 'more burden-
some': a personal obligation which is limited to $3.6 million, or a 'nonrecourse'
$38 million construction loan which puts at risk everything the borrower sinks
into the project. Fortunately, in this case we need not answer this question."
(emphasis added)).
122. Id.
123. 444 P.2d 65 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
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nor in other respects more burdensome than that of the prin-
cipal ... .' Therefore, since the liability of a surety is com-
mensurate with that of the principal, where the principal is
not liable on the obligation, neither is the guarantor."12 The
common law underpinnings to the above rule were explained
in Anderson v. Shaffer"5 which states that it is unjust and in-
congruous to hold a guarantor liable, unless the prime obligor
has some obligation.' "Consequently, no liability can be im-
posed upon [the] guarantors unless [the prime obligor] is li-
able under the [loan documents].""7 Although these absolute
124. Id. at 74-75 (emphasis added).
125. 277 P. 185 (Cal. Ct. App. 1929).
126. Id. at 189-90. The Anderson court defined the surety's obligation:
The obligation of a surety is an obligation accessory to that of a princi-
pal debtor, and it is of the essence of this obligation that there should
be a valid obligation of some principal .... If the principal is not
holden, neither is the surety; for there can be no accessory if there is
no principal .... "It is correctly laid down in Chitty on Contracts that
the contract of a surety is a collateral engagement for another, as dis-
tinguished from an original and direct agreement for the party's own
act; and, as is stated in Theobold on Principal and Surety,... it is a
corollary from the very definition of a contract of suretyship that, the
obligation of the surety being accessory to the obligation of the princi-
pal debtor or obligor, it is of its essence that there should be a valid
obligation of such a principal, and that the nullity of the principal obli-
gation necessarily induces the nullity of the accessory .... It would be
most unjust and incongruous to hold the surety liable where the prin-
cipal is not bound.
Id. (citations omitted). Accord Bloom v. Bender, 313 P.2d 568, 573-74 (Cal.
1957) (citing the Code of Napoleon, which explained that section 2809 of the
California Civil Code merely codifies ancient law: "[tihe security must not ex-
ceed what is due from the debtor, nor be contracted under conditions more
burthensome. It may be contracted for a part of a debt only, and under condi-
tions less burthensome."); County of San Diego v. Viloria, 80 Cal. Rptr. 869, 874
(Ct. App. 1969). The Viloria court stated:
By statute the liability of a guarantor is commensurate with that of
the principal, CAL. CIV. CODE § 2809. "[Wlhere the principal is not li-
able on the obligation, neither is the guarantor," U.S. Leasing Corp. v.
Du Pont, 444 P.2d 65 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968). In the case at bench [the
prime obligor's] liability for hospitalization was limited to his ability to
pay. The evidence establishes without question he was unable to pay
anything at the time the services were rendered. Thus, there is no
debt or default for which defendant [the guarantor] is answerable.
Id.; accord Barbara B. Rintala, California's Anti-deficiency Legislation and
Suretyship Law: The Transversion of Protective Statutory Schemes, 17 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 245, 290 (1969). The rule that at the time of the contracting a guaran-
tor cannot agree to perform higher and greater obligations than those imposed
on the principal is a restatement of "the equitable principles underlying [§
2809] and related suretyship provisions [such as § 2810] which delimit the tri-
partite surety-principal-creditor relationship." Id.
127. U.S. Leasing Corp., 444 P.2d at 75.
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rules appear to contradict case law holding that a guarantor
may agree to increase his obligation beyond that of his prin-
cipal,2 8 the conflicting rules are harmonized when one real-
izes that: (1) after contracting, a guarantor's obligation may
be increased beyond the prime obligor; but (2) at the time of
contracting, the guarantor's obligation may not exceed that of
the prime obligor."9
As stated in Mortgage Finance Corp. v. Howard,3 ° "[t]he
requirements of section 2809 are fully met if the surety's ob-
128. Id. For example, Bloom v. Bender held that where the statute of limita-
tions runs against the prime obligor, but not against the guarantor, section
2809 of the California Civil Code does not prevent the creditor from seeking a
full recovery from the guarantor. Bloom, 313 P.2d at 574. Moreover, Loeb v.
Christie, held that where a guarantor's liability on a note may be enforced
without first resorting to the security, section 2809 of the Civil Code does not
bar a creditor from seeking a full recovery from the guarantor. Loeb v. Chris-
tie, 57 P.2d 1303, 1303-04 (Cal. 1936). But, note that the result in Loeb, a 1936
case, would have a different result today because a pre-1939 guarantor had no
right to require a lender to proceed first against the encumbered property. Id.
Also, Heckes v. Sapp held that where antideficiency legislation prevents a
lender from seeking a deficiency judgment against the prime obligor, section
2809 of the Civil Code does not preclude the creditor from collecting a defi-
ciency from the guarantor. Heckes v. Sapp, 40 Cal. Rptr. 485, 488 (Ct. App.
1964).
129. In Bloom (313 P.2d 568 (Cal. 1957)), Loeb (57 P.2d 1303 (Cal. 1936)),
and Heckes (40 Cal. Rptr. 485 (Ct. App. 1964)), the guarantors' obligations did
not exceed the obligation of the prime obligors at the time of contracting:
(1) In Bloom, the prime obligor was obligated to the creditor for the full
amount of the note at the inception of the guaranty. Bloom, 313 P.2d at 573-74.
The prime obligor merely asserted a statute of limitations defense to liability
for the deficiency. Id.
(2) In Loeb, the prime obligor also was obligated for the full amount of the
note at the inception of the guaranty:
The liability of the principal or maker of a note secured by mortgage or
trust deed is for the face amount of the note and is not simply for any
deficiency remaining after foreclosure or sale .... A mortgage, trust
deed, or any other security is merely a fund which the princi-
pal... makes available for the performance of his obligation to pay.
Though the.., trust deed security becomes the primary fund for the
discharge of the indebtedness, by virtue, respectively of the provisions
of [Civil Procedure] section 726... it merely remains a source from
which the obligation of the principal... is to be repaid. The principal
debtor remains liable at all times for the full amount of the obligation
and may be compelled to pay it, first out of the security, and thereafter
out of the general assets.
Loeb, 57 P.2d at 1304 (emphasis added).
(3) Similarly, in Heckes, the prime obligor was obligated for the full
amount of the note at the inception of the guaranty, but merely chose to invoke
the antideficiency defense of section 580b of the California Code of Civil Proce-
dure to limit its liability. Heckes, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
130. 26 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Ct. App. 1962).
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ligation, when undertaken, does not exceed the obligation of
the principal. .. .""' However, if at the time the guaranty is
executed, "'there is no primary liability on the part of [the
prime obligor], . . there is nothing to guarantee, and hence
there can be no contract of guaranty.'" 2
It then follows that a guarantor's liability for the guar-
anty of a nonrecourse note is exonerated under section 2809
of the Civil Code, 3' because at the time such guaranty is exe-
cuted, the guarantor's obligations are greater and more bur-
densome than that of the debtor.
VI. WAIVERS OF SURETYSHIP DEFENSES, SUCH AS SECTION
2809, SUBJECT TO CATHAY BANK TEST
Waivers of suretyship defenses, including. section 2809 of
the California Civil Code, should be evaluated under the test
articulated in Cathay Bank v. Lee.' Cathay Bank restates
the traditional view that an adequate waiver must state the
precise nature of the defense and the fact that it is being
waived.'35 However, the appellate court in River Bank Amer-
ica inexplicably declined to evaluate the guarantor's waiver
of section 2809 of the Civil Code by the test described in Ca-
thay Bank3' for the following three purported reasons:
First, Cathay Bank did not purport to set out a wavier
[sic] standard applicable to all surety defenses. To the
contrary, Cathay Bank focused on the narrow issue of
whether there was a sufficient waiver of the Gradsky de-
131. Id. at 919.
132. Somers v. United States F. & G. Co., 217 P. 746, 749 (Cal. 1923); accord
Bloom, 313 P.2d at 573-74. The Bloom court stated:
[The] rule of the civil law [codified in § 2809] appears to relate to con-
ditions at the time of the execution of a guarantee agreement, and to
provide that at the time of the contracting of the surety's obligations
he cannot agree to perform higher and greater obligations than those
imposed on the principal debtor .... [Thus,] a surety is not liable
where the principal does not incur any obligation under the basic con-
tract.
Id. Conversely, once the original obligations of the principal and guarantor are
fixed, the guarantor may then agree to modify his obligation to make it greater
than that of the principal
133. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2809 (West 1993).
134. 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 420 (Ct. App. 1993).
135. River Bank Am. v. Diller, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 799-800 (Ct. App. 1995)(interpreting Cathay Bank v. Lee, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 420 (Ct. App. 1993)).
136. Id. at 800 ("We decline to apply Cathay Bank's strict waiver require-
ments in this case.").
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fense.137
Second, unlike Bloom [v. Bender], Cathay Bank did not
address... the waiver of a defense based on Civil Code
section 2809.138
Third, although it purports to be "declarative of existing
law" it is clear that the Legislature enacted [Civil Code]
section 2856 to ameliorate the strict rule laid down in Ca-
thay Bank.13 9
These arguments fail because the Cathay Bank court did
not limit its analysis to Gradsky defense waivers." ' Rather,
Cathay Bank merely articulated preexisting general princi-
ples of waiver, citing waiver cases completely unrelated to
guaranty waivers."" Further, there is nothing unique about
the Gradsky defense that requires a more "strict" waiver
than a waiver under section 2809 of the Civil Code"' waiver
(or of any waiver). Moreover, a waiver of a statutory right,
arguably should be held to a higher standard than a waiver
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. See supra Section II.B (discussing that section 2856 of the Califor-
nia Civil Code did not abrogate Cathay Bank).
140. Cathay Bank v. Lee, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 420 (Ct. App. 1993). Union Bank
v. Gradsky held that where a lender elects to proceed by nonjudicial foreclo-
sure, rather than by judicial foreclosure, the lender destroys the guarantor's
right of subrogation, and thus the lender is estopped from seeking a deficiency
from the guarantor. Union Bank v. Gradsky, 71 Cal. Rptr. 64 (Ct. App. 1968).
This defense has been dubbed the "Gradsky defense."
141. Cathay Bank, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 423-24. The court stated:
The first principles of waiver buttress our conclusion. Waiver is the
intentional relinquishment of a known right. (BP Alaska Exploration,
Inc. v. Superior Court (1988) 199 Cal. App. 3d 1240, 1252, 245 Cal.
Rptr. 682 [erroneous legal concession not waiver because not inten-
tional and knowing].) "The burden is on the party claiming the waiver
to prove it by clear and convincing evidence that'" 'does not leave the
matter doubtful or uncertain .... ' " ' " (Pacific Valley Bank v.
Schwenke (1987) 189 Cal. App. 3d 134, 145, 234 Cal. Rptr. 298, quoting
In re Marriage of Vomacka (1984) 36 Cal.3d 459, 469, 204 Cal. Rptr.
568, 683 P.2d 248.) Waiver requires "'sufficient awareness of the rele-
vant circumstances and likely consequences ...." (In re Marriage of
Perkal (1988) 203 Cal. App. 3d 1198, 1203, 250 Cal. Rptr. 296, quoting
In re Marriage of Moore (1980) 113 Cal. App. 3d 22, 27, 169 Cal. Rptr.
619.)
These principles emphasize actual knowledge and awareness of
what is being waived, and require resolution of doubts against waiver.
Id. Note that none of the cases cited by Cathay Bank above involved the ade-
quacy of a Gradsky waiver.
142. CAL. Civ. CODE § 2809 (West 1993).
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of a judicially created right.
As stated by the River Bank America appellate court,
Cathay Bank requires that a written waiver "must state the
precise nature of the guarantor's defense and the fact that it
is being waived."' This is not a new waiver standard. Ca-
thay Bank merely restates the law for effective waivers of all
types, not just Gradsky waivers.
For example, in Bauman v. Islay Investments,'" the court
held that a provision in a rental agreement for a cleaning fee
was not an adequate waiver of tenants' rights under section
1951 of the Civil Code because:
... it is settled law in California that a purported "waiver"
of a statutory right is not legally effective unless it ap-
pears that the party executing it had been fully informed
of the existence of that right, its meaning, the effect of the
"waiver" presented to him, and his full understanding of
the explanation."
45
In B. W. v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance,8 the
court held that a waiver of section 1000.5 of the California
Penal Code"17 is not effective unless the party has been fully
informed of the existence and meaning of the right being
waived and effect of a waiver of that right.""
In In re Marriage of Moore, the court found that a wife's
waiver in a separation agreement of a right to her husband's
retirement benefits was unenforceable unless she
143. River Bank Am. v. Diller, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 799 (Ct. App. 1995)
(interpreting Cathay Bank v. Lee, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 420 (Ct. App. 1993)).
144. 106 Cal. Rptr. 889 (Ct. App. 1973).
145. Id. at 893. Section 1951(c) of the California Civil Code limits a land-
lord's right to claim only the amount of the deposit for cleaning fees necessary
to clean the premises on termination of the tenancy. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1951(c)
(West 1985).
146. 215 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Ct. App. 1985).
147. Section 1000.5 of the California Penal Code provides that, upon success-
ful completion of a drug abuse diversion program, the record pertaining to the
arrest "shall not, without the divertee's consent, be used in any way which
could result in the denial of any employment, benefit, license, or certificate."
CAL. PEN. CODE § 1000.5 (West Supp. 1996).
148. B. W. v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance, 215 Cal. Rptr. 130, 138
(Ct. App. 1985). The court clarified that:
It is settled in California that a purported "waiver" of a statutory right
is not legally effective unless it appears that the party charged with
the waiver has been fully informed of the existence of that right, its
meaning, the effect of the "waiver" presented to him, and his full un-
derstanding of the explanation.
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"intentionally relinquished 'a known right after knowledge of
the facts.'"149
In Roberts v. Superior Court,' the court held that the
waiver of a physician-patient privilege must be done with
awareness of the consequences of that waiver. "The waiver
of an important right must be a voluntary and knowing act
done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances
and likely consequences.
In Hittle v. Santa Barbara County Employees' Retirement
Association,'52 the appellate court determined that the trial
court erred in finding that an employee knowingly waived his
right to apply for disability retirement, stating: "'The valid
waiver of a right presupposes an actual and demonstrable
knowledge of the very right being waived' ...... 1 '
The above is a nonexhaustive, but illustrative, list of
waiver cases, all unrelated to Gradsky waivers. These
waiver cases all apply the basic principle articulated in Ca-
thay Bank that a waiver "must state the precise nature of the
guarantor's defense [or more generally the right being
waived] and the fact that it is being waived."'54 Accordingly,
the test articulated in Cathay Bank applies to waivers of all
statutory suretyship defenses, including waivers of section
2809 of the California Civil Code.'55
CONCLUSION
There are several defenses available to a guarantor of a
real property secured transaction. If a lender proceeds by
nonjudicial foreclosure, then seeks a deficiency from a guar-
antor, a guarantor may invoke the Gradsky defense'56 (unless
that defense is adequately waived). A guarantor may also
invoke a "Gradsky-type" defense if a lender proceeds by judi-
cial foreclosure, but fails to apply for a fair value hearing un-
der section 726(b) of the California Code of Civil Procedure'57
149. In re Marriage of Moore, 169 Cal. Rptr. 619, 624 (Ct. App. 1980).
150. 508 P.2d 309 (Cal. 1973).
151. Id. at 317.
152. 703 P.2d 73 (Ct. App. 1985).
153. Id. at 82 (citing Jones v. Brown, 89 Cal. Rptr. 651 (Ct. App. 1970)).
154. River Bank Am. v. Diller, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 799 (Ct. App. 1995)
(interpreting Cathay Bank v. Lee, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 420 (Ct. App. 1993)).
155. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2809 (West 1993).
156. See discussion supra Section II regarding Gradsky defense.
157. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726(b) (West 1980 & Supp. 1996).
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within three months of the foreclosure sale. Where a lender
asserts that the Gradsky defense was waived in a guaranty,
a guarantor may counter this assertion by claiming that the
guaranty language is inadequate if the guaranty language
fails to meet the established test for adequate waivers, as ar-
ticulated in Cathay Bank v. Lee."8 As previously discussed,
Cathay Bank v. Lee was not abrogated by recently enacted
section 2856 of the California Civil Code. 9
Alternatively, if a lender proceeds by judicial foreclosure
and then seeks a deficiency from a guarantor, a guarantor
might argue that sound application of antideficiency legisla-
tion policies dictates that a guarantor should be able to in-
voke the fair value protections of section 726(b) of the Cali-
fornia Code of Civil Procedure, 6 ° and thus limit his liability
to the difference between the unpaid balance of the note (plus
expenses) and the fair value of the property. Any waiver of
the fair value limitations of section 726(b) of the Code of Civil
Procedure must be knowing and voluntary.'
On the other hand, if a lender chooses to proceed directly
against a guarantor without first foreclosing on the property,
a guarantor may invoke the section 2845 defense.'62 Again,
any waiver of this defense must be both knowing and volun-
tary.
6 3
Additionally, if a guarantor establishes that he is a "de
facto prime obligor" and that a guaranty is a mere "sham,"
then the guarantor may successfully assert all of the antide-
ficiency protections afforded a prime obligor.1'6 Notably, a
guaranty of a nonrecourse note is a sham.6 '
Finally, section 2809 of the California Civil Code 66 pro-
vides a defense to a guarantor where his obligation is larger
in amount or more burdensome than that of the prime obli-
gor..167 Thus, section 2809 prevents a lender from enforcing a
158. Cathay Bank v. Lee, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 420 (Ct. App. 1993).
159. CAL. Civ. CODE § 2856 (West Supp. 1996); see discussion supra Section
II.B.
160. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 726(b) (West 1980 & Supp. 1996).
161. See Cathay Bank v. Lee, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 420 (Ct. App. 1993).
162. CAL. Civ. CODE § 2845 (West 1993).
163. See Cathay Bank v. Lee, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 420 (Ct. App. 1993).
164. See discussion supra Section IV.
165. See discussion supra Section IV.
166. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2809 (West 1993).
167. See discussion supra Section V.
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guaranty of a nonrecourse note. 16 Moreover, any waivers of
the suretyship defenses, including section 2809 waivers,
must be knowing and voluntary, and we argue that it is ap-
propriate to test them by the existing law on waivers, as re-
stated by the court in Cathay Bank v. Lee."9
In effect, whether a lender proceeds by nonjudicial fore-
closure, judicial foreclosure, or directly against the guarantor
without foreclosure, a guarantor has many defenses at his
disposal to eliminate or limit his liability.
168. See discussion supra Section V.
169. See discussion supra Section VI.
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APPENDIX A
August 4, 1994
The Honorable Louis Caldera
California State Assembly
P.O. Box 942849
Sacramento, CA 94249-0001
Re: Opposition to AB 3101, as amended June 21, 1994
Dear Assembly Member Caldera:
Consumers Union, the nonprofit publisher of Consumer Re-
ports magazine, regrets to inform you of our opposition to AB 3101.
Our opposition is based on two grounds.
First, we believe the bill should not apply to consumer residen-
tial real estate secured loans, but only to commercial transactions.
Consumers who obtain a home loan, or individuals who may be re-
quired by lenders to guarantee such loans (relatives or other indi-
viduals) need the protection under current law. Thus, the bill
should contain an exemption for obligations secured by a deed of
trust on a residence for 1-4 families, similar to the language in your
AB 3071 (re letters of credit). In addition, the reference on p. 2, line
21 to Section 580b of the Code of Civil Procedure appears to be un-
necessary and overbroad. The Cathay Bank decision concerned
only Section 580d - nonjudicial foreclosures on non-purchase money
mortgages. Section 580b, on the other hand, applies only to
purchase money mortgages for residential dwellings. Including
"580b" in the bill's current form would give lenders a loophole
around the antideficiency law for purchase money mortgages on
residences.
Second, our more general concern is with the bill's apparent
weakening of basic principles of waiver law. A waiver is an inten-
tional relinquishment of a known right. We believe the Cathay
Bank court correctly invalidated the waiver at issue in that case.
We agree with the Court that the waiver there was "insufficiently
specific about the precise rights that are being waived" (original em-
phasis) (14 Cal.App.4th 1533, 1539 (1993)). To be effective, waivers
must specifically state in plain language the entirety of rights that
are being waived, which was not done in Cathay Bank.
Paragraph 4 of the purported "waiver" in Cathay Bank com-
pletely failed to state that the guarantor was in fact waiving any
specified rights or defenses: "Guarantor shall be liable to Bank for
any deficiency.., even though any rights of which Guarantor may
have against others by be... destroyed" (id. at 1536 & n.4) (empha-
sis added). The language failed to reveal that "any rights" included
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the guarantor's complete defense against a deficiency judgment and
that executing the agreement would in fact waive that defense. The
Court also found paragraph 5 of the "waiver" to be "hopeless[ly]"
confusing and even more vague than paragraph 4 (id. at 1541).
In our view, any "uncertainty" in this area has not been caused
by the courts-who have merely applied hornbook waiver law-but
instead by careless drafting of waivers by banks. We don't believe
the Legislature ought to overturn court decisions in order to bail
out poor drafting by bank lawyers.
Very truly yours,
Earl Lui
Staff Attorney
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APPENDIX B
August 11, 1994
Assemblymember Louis Caldera
State Capitol, Room 2176
Sacramento, Ca. 94249-0001
RE: AB 3101 (Caldera) OPPOSE
Dear Assemblymember Caldera:
The California Trial Lawyers Association opposes AB 3101, which
is scheduled to be heard before the Senate Judiciary Committee on
August 6, 1994.
AB 3101 overturns the holding in Cathay Bank v. Lee (1993) 14
Cal.App.4th 1533, which applied the well-reasoned principles of
Union Bank v. Gradsky (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 40.
1. Current law makes sense because if a lender elects to foreclose
non-judicially, it should bear the consequences of that choice absent
an explicit and clear waiver by the guarantor.
California law contains an anti-deficiency statute (Code of Civil
Procedure Section 580d); although the statute does not protect
guarantors directly, as a practical matter, case law and the "Grad-
sky defense" preclude deficiency judgments against guarantors un-
less the lender elects judicial foreclosure instead of non-judicial
foreclosure. (Cathay Bank, supra, 1535).
It works like this: after default, the lender has the choice to fore-
close judicially or non-judicially. If judicial foreclosure is chosen
and there is a remaining deficiency, the lender can try to collet on
the deficiency and the debtor has a right of redemption. If the
lender chooses to foreclose non-judicially, the remedy is usually
quicker and it is easier for the lender to manipulate the sale. How-
ever, the anti-deficiency statutes kick in, and the lender can not
collect on a deficiency. This extends to guarantors and to lines of
credit. However, the guarantor can waive this right to be protected
by the anti-deficiency statutes. This is known as a "Gradsky de-
fense" or waiver.
In Gradsky, the court found that the lender was estopped from col-
lecting a deficiency judgment against the guarantor when the
lender had opted to foreclose non-judicially. The court reasoned
that by electing to foreclose non-judicially, the lender had effec-
tively cut off the guarantor's rights to subrogation: the guarantor
could not then collect from the borrower, since the borrower was
protected by the anti-deficiency statutes.
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In Cathay Bank, the court held that a continuing guaranty had
failed to explicitly waive the Gradsky defense. The guaranty lan-
guage neither explained what the defense was, nor the legal conse-
quences of waiving it. The waiver was therefore defective because
it was not intentional and knowing.
AB 3101 flies in the face of settled and anti-deficiency and waiver
law. It creates an exception to the rule that a waiver must be an
intentional relinquishment of a known right.
2. AB 3101 has broad implications; by legislating that waivers need
not be an intentional relinquishment of a known right, the Legisla-
ture would start the chipping away of long-standing waiver law.
A waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. Valid
waivers must specifically state in plain English what rights are be-
ing waived so that the consumer who signs a waiver will under-
stand the implications.
It is becoming increasingly common for large institutions to seek to
limit their responsibilities under the law by having consumers sign
waivers. If the Legislature condones waivers that do not meet the
well-accepted standards, the implications are serious.
3. Lenders claim that their current contracts may not contain suffi-
cient language and hence be invalid under Cathay Bank: however,
if they had written the waivers properly in the first place, they
would not be in that situation. The Legislature should not ratify
invalid waivers.
Lenders claim that they are concerned about the validity of waiver
language in current contracts. They claim that many of the current
waivers may not meet the Cathay Bank qualifications. Strangely,
the argument is that their contracts do not present intentional re-
linquishments of known rights. If this is true, these contracts
should be invalid.
Further, as detailed in the attached Continuing Education of the
Bar materials, sample language has been available to lenders. If
lenders chose to write their own language in a vague fashion, we
should not now ratify its effectiveness.
If you or a member of your staff would like to discuss this issue
further, please fee free to contact me or one our legislative repre-
sentatives in Sacramento.
Sincerely,
Doug de Vries
President
cc: Senate Judiciary Committee
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APPENDIX C
August 4, 1994
The Honorable Bill Lockyer
California State Senate
State Capitol, Room 205
Sacramento, California 95814
RE: OPPOSE - AB 3101 (Caldera)
Senate Judiciary Committee - August 9, 1994
Dear Senator Lockyer:
The California Apartment Association (CAA), representing over
20,000 developers, owners and managers of residential rental prop-
erty throughout the state, must oppose AB 3101. This measure
would abrogate the holding of the Cathay Bank vs. Lee decision re-
garding "Gradsky waivers" in guaranties utilized in secured real
property financing.
CAA is aware that the Cathay decision causes concern in the lender
community regarding the specificity of Gradsky waivers; however,
these waivers, which were originally authorized by an appellate
court decision (Union Bank vs. Gradsky), have always been subject
to a case by case, transaction by transaction, review. Thus, caselaw
has been very important in the development and use of these
waivers.
The Cathay case is not an aberration - the court simply defines and
delineates what must be contained in a Gradsky waiver in order to
be effective. Prior to this case, there was no standard other than
the very general requirement that the waiver be "an express con-
tract" or "sufficiently explicit" (See Gradsky at page 48). The stan-
dard set out by the Cathay decision is not a difficult one to meet,
and is consistent with the principle that a party can only waive a
right or defense if he or she knows and understands that the right
or defense is available in the first place.
We believe that the present economic circumstances relating to real
property values have contributed to the assertion that this decision
has created havoc in real property financing. Our concern is from
the consumer side: where once property was worth more than the
paper, and now is not, a lender may take the property back by non-
judicial foreclosure, discount and/or mismanage the asset without
concern as the guarantor will be forced to pay the deficiency based
upon a waiver that may not have been made clear to the guarantor.
As presently drafted, AB 3101 would allow a lender to get around
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the one action rule based upon a Gradsky waiver that was not spe-
cific in explaining the guarantor's underlying rights of subrogation
and reimbursement which are destroyed by the lender's choice of
remedies, a choice over which the guarantor has no control. Addi-
tionally, the waiver may not be clear that the guarantor has a de-
fense to the deficiency action under the one action rule when the
lender selects nonjudicial foreclosure, and that it is this defense
that the guarantor is giving up by signing the waiver document.
Further, AB 3101, by stating that it is declarative of existing law
without Cathay leaves in place and statutorily enacts a very gen-
eral and ambiguous standard for Gradsky waivers, both for those in
existence and future waiver documents. The only guidance the bill
gives as to what "express" means is in the negative - the waiver
language need not contain any references to statutes or judicial de-
cisions. If AB 3101 becomes law, Gradsky waivers will again be
subject to case by case scrutiny without any certainty as to what
language is sufficient to truly educate the guarantor on the de-
fenses and rights that he or she is giving up by signing the waiver
document.
It is our position that the Cathay ruling should be allowed to stand,
and that any statutory standard for Gradsky waivers crafted
through legislation should be prospective in application. Thank you
for considering our views. We are available to meet either you or
your staff at the earliest possible convenience should you so desire.
Respectfully,
CALIFORNIA APARTMENT ASSOCIATION
By:
Thomas K. Bannon
Executive Vice President
TKB:dmc
cc: Assemblymember Caldera
Senate Judiciary Staff
Maurine Padden, CBA
Rex Hime, BPOA
Stan Wieg, CAR
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